I'm a research analyst intern at GNG Research here for the summer. I wanted to put together an update on where the REIT sector stands in 2026, run through the same cash flow lens our coverage list gets held to. What that lens keeps surfacing is that the metrics income investors trust most are the ones least able to tell a healthy REIT from a failing one. This field guide works the sector from the cash flow down, starting with FFO and AFFO rather than reported earnings, then layering in payout coverage, leverage, and the discount to private market value.
Run a screen for income today and two names surface near the top: VICI Properties, yielding about 6.4%, and SL Green, which yielded close to 6% until the cuts and now sits near 5%. A yield screen still lines them up as similar income ideas. When you read the cash flow underneath, they turn out to be opposites.
VICI pays out around three quarters of its adjusted cash flow, and it has raised that dividend every year since going public in 2018. SL Green’s dividend looks covered if you firmly trust its reported earnings, but the company doesn’t generate anywhere close to enough cash to fund the checks it writes. Over the last few years the company has been cutting the payout rather than raising it. One dividend slowly compounds, while the other erodes. Two stocks that screen alike, and almost nothing else in common.
This gap is the reason for this article. The yield screen can’t separate those two for the same reason a price to earnings screen can’t. Accounting was never built for real estate. Depreciation assumes a building loses value at a fixed rate year over year, the way a car does, which is in my eyes the exact opposite of how a healthy property behaves. When you push that assumption through the income statement it hides the real earning power, so a healthy net lease operator and a sinking office landlord end up looking biologically related on a spreadsheet.
My goal here is to teach you how to read the sector, not to hand you a list of tickers to pick. My thesis is short and simple. In 2026, the REITs worth your attention are the ones where cash flow is durable and the discount is to what the property would fetch in a private sale. Not to an income stream that is already eroding. Apply this across the sector and it begins to sort itself out, from grocery anchored shopping centers at the top to commodity offices at the bottom.
One thing has changed since last year, and it shapes everything below. The easy money that investors had penciled in for REITs has stalled. The Federal Reserve has held its target range at 3.50% to 3.75% through four straight meetings, and under its new chair, Kevin Warsh, big money leaned hawkish. Several officials sketched in a rate hike, the inflation forecast has moved up to 3.6%, and futures traders started pricing real odds of an increase before the year ends. The 10 year Treasury sits in the 4.4% to 4.5% range. Now none of this breaks the sector, but it raises the stakes for any REIT whose value depends on long dated and bond like cash flows.
The question to ask yourself throughout: which of these are good real estate, which are bad real estate, and which are good cash flow priced at the wrong interest rate sensitivity?
The metric that actually matters
Let’s start with the fix for the broken P/E, because everything builds on it. Real estate analysts gave up on earnings a long time ago in favor of Funds From Operations, or FFO, which is net income with depreciation added back and a one time property sale gains taken out of the equation. Following FFO they move to AFFO, sometimes seen as FAD or CAD, which also subtracts the ugly costs of keeping buildings full (maintenance capex, leasing commissions, tenant improvements). What survives all of that is the best honest estimate of the cash a REIT can actually pay out to you.
Realty Income, the best known monthly dividend payer out there, makes the point simple. Its distribution annualizes to around $3.25 a share. Annualize the $0.33 of GAAP earnings it reported last quarter to roughly $1.32 for the full year, set the dividend against it, and the payout runs past 200%, a figure that would send any income investor toward the door. Set the same dividend against the company’s 2026 AFFO guidance of $4.41 to $4.44 and the payout drops to 73%, which is how Realty Income has managed to raise its dividend 135 times. Rexford Industrial shows the same illusion but from another direction. Its dividend looks like 184% of trailing earnings but only about 73% of FFO.
If you want to watch this old metric fail, let’s look at the two office names again. On reported earnings, SL Green carries a negative P/E and Vornado a forward P/E somewhere around 2,500 times, though that figure is an artifact of a near zero earnings estimate rather than a real valuation. These are not valuations. This is what is left after depreciation and write downs after an income statement is gutted. Again these are the exact figures a careful REIT process throws out of the equation.
Something to note before moving on. There is no single “REIT multiple.” The broad listed group has been trading closer to 14 to 16 times forward FFO, and while being conservative we use 13 times as a benchmark. Fighting over the index number simply put does not get you anywhere. What works is comparing each name to its own sector and its own history. A shopping center against other shopping centers, and a tower against other towers.
What our screen flags
When I run our coverage list through that same cash flow lens, one name dominates the page. Rexford Industrial is the only one of the REITs that our model rates a Very Strong Buy, trading around $34.81 against a fair value that our system put at $60.79, and with a discount of 43%. The size of the gap is big, but the disagreement around it is what I find more interesting and therefore telling. Our own work is emphatic on the name, while the quant signal and Wall Street consensus both sit at a Hold. A stock where the fundamentals and the price are pointing in two opposite directions is usually where I find either an opportunity or a lesson to be learned.
At the safer end of the list, VICI and Essential Properties look fairly strong to me on the plain measures that actually protect a dividend. Low leverage and high interest coverage, with VICI earning enough to cover its interest payments close to five or so times. The two office names, SL Green and Vornado, sit at the opposite side of the extreme, carrying the widest and largest premiums to our fair value metric that I have researched. SL Green is the clearest warning. It covers only about one third of its interest bill, which is the thinnest cushion on any other ticker I mention.
Some notes on how I read these. When scoring and looking at REITs, I look at recurring operating cash flow rather than earnings. Also I have to mention that I pay little mind to bankruptcy style distress scores, because those formulas treat the heavy, structural debt every property company carries as a red flag, and they will do it even on an investment grade balance sheet like Realty Income’s. This tells me more about the formula than the company itself. One name I’m leaving out on purpose is Brixmor, because it is not in our coverage so I’ve leaned on its closest peers like Kite Realty and Regency.
Walking the sectors
Grocery anchored strip retail is the best set up in the business, and no one talks about it. New supply barely exists, foot traffic holds up whether the market is rising or falling, and landlords keep their pricing power. Kite Realty went into 2026 about 95% leased, then signed new leases 31% above the rents they replaced, with blended spreads around 13% once renewals are mixed in, grew same store income 3.6%, and drew nearly 80% of its rent from grocery anchored centers. All of this while buying back stock and lifting the dividend more than 7%.
One caveat for anyone who runs the ticker: our own system actually has Kite at a Hold, trading about 19% above our fair value, with the quant and the street at Hold too. On Rexford I sided with our model against the quant and the street. Here I am doing the reverse, backing Kite’s leasing, occupancy, and grocery mix over a screen that says the re-rating already happened. Regency is the blue chip standard here, and Brixmor, which sits outside our coverage, is the cheaper open-air peer I keep an eye on. The private market is confirming those public discounts too. When Ares took Whitestone private this spring in a deal worth about $1.7 billion, it was buying convenience and neighborhood centers across Texas and Arizona rather than a grocery-anchored book, but the read through still holds. Necessity based open-air retail clears at full value in private hands even when the public stocks do not.
Triple net lease REITs own the most dependable rent in the sector, and the most interest rate risk to go with it. The leases are long, and the tenant pays the taxes, insurance, and upkeep, which makes the income stream steady and predictable. Realty Income covers its dividend at about 73% of AFFO, carries leverage near 5.2x, and funds its growth with large private capital partners. Essential Properties is the faster growing version of the same model, and NNN REIT, the former National Retail Properties, is the slow conservative counterpart. Now come the gaming REITs. VICI yields about 6.4%, pays out three quarters of AFFO, has inflation built into its lease, and has raised its dividend for eight years running, yet it still trades around 11 times AFFO. The risk across the whole cohort is time and duration. Long leases with small annual bumps behave like tenured bonds, and a Fed that keeps hikes on the table is the wrong backdrop for that.
Industrial is a supply glut that is working its way through the system. Rexford’s Southern California warehouses run about 96% full, backed by a balance sheet at 4.5x leverage, debt locked in near 3.7%, and nothing due until 2027. A single large renewal signed at a negative releasing spread last quarter, meaning the new rent came in below the old one, but one deal does not change the direction of the broader lease book, which is still rolling up to market. Leadership is buying back stock to slowly close the distance between a share price near 14.5 times forward FFO and a business that used to earn a multiple up in the high teens. This distance is the widest mispricing I’ve seen and is why I put Rexford at the front of the featured names.
Towers and data centers are the de-rated infrastructure trade. American Tower has dropped to around 16 times AFFO, below the premium it once demanded, as a one time wave of churn from the DISH wind down rolls off and its CoreSite data arm reaches an inflection point. Interconnection demand is driving double digit growth, and the dividend still rose 5%. Data centers as a group are the familiar case of a great business at an uncomfortable price to entry. In my eyes Digital Realty is the cheaper door than Equinix, with AI buildout providing a long term push to keep the market bullish.
Apartments trade at near record gap to private value just as the good old fundamentals turn. CBRE put multifamily vacancy at 4.8% in the first quarter, down 20 basis points, as apartment demand outran new supply for the first time in three quarters. The Sunbelt construction wave is finally rolling off. The choice inside the sector is mostly about geography and structure, coastal landlords like Equity Residential and Avalon Bay, and the Sunbelt growth of Mid America. The rest of the map fills in around this core idea. Healthcare splits between growth and income, with Welltower riding the senior housing demographic and Omega Healthcare offering a roughly 7% skilled nursing yield. Self storage sets the EXR operating platform against the PSA blue chip. Malls stay a barbell, with Simon as the quality compounder and Macerich as the leveraged turnaround. Timber, through Weyerhaeuser and Rayonier, is really a housing and land play in a REIT wrapper. To learn more about Rayonier I covered the company in my previous publication.
That leaves office, which holds the deepest discounts and in my opinion the most dangerous game to play. Headline vacancy is bad, and data providers no longer can come to terms on how bad. CBRE has overall office vacancy at 18.6% and prime space being just at 12.7%, Cushman near 20%, and Moody’s up around 21%.
What is happening underneath those numbers is the real story and what matters to me more. Net absorption has reached post pandemic highs, and for the first time in decades more office space is being torn down or converted than actually built. The recovery is split, and Trophy and Class A buildings are healing while commodity space keeps rotting away. The split is why a large office can look cheap with price to FFO and still be expensive after you or I account for what it costs to keep the buildings leased. The way I approach it is to own the differentiated pockets: the trophy, transit connected, defense leased, and life science assets, and to leave the commodity box alone.
Where it all nets out
I’ve been ranking these sectors by how confidently I can underwrite the next several years of cash flow, rather than by yield or the size of the discount itself, and by doing that the order becomes clear. Grocery anchored retail first, triple net second, with the rate sensitivity attached alongside it. Then apartments, industrial, gaming, and towers. Off this list, two sleeves earn the label of a great business at a poor price for the patient investor such as a retiree or dividend investor. Data centers, where I prefer Digital Realty to Equinix on entry, and senior housing where Omega is the income play. Office is the deepest value and the highest risk trap for sure, that is only worth touching through its differentiated names. The four cleanest mispricings, the ones I have featured, stay the same: Rexford, VICI, American Tower, and Kite Realty.
There are three things that are worth carrying out of all this. First, for a REIT, recurring cash flow has to beat accounting earnings, so start by looking at AFFO and never EPS. Second, a high yield is only worth owning when the AFFO payout, the leverage, and the refinancing schedule all support. Third, a large discount to net asset value is only viewed as a gift when the real estate underneath still has durable and prolonged demand with a somewhat manageable upkeep. Otherwise I just see it as the slowest way to bleed capital.
The variables that settle it from here are not hard to name: the path of the 10 year and a Fed that has put hikes back on the table, how fast private market cap rates move, whether shopping center supply stays as tight as it is now, and whether office demand really inflects or only does so at the very top of the market. If these variables break in REITs’ favor, shopping centers, net lease, and the de-rated infrastructure names can re-rate together. If they break the other way, office can stay cheap far longer than any analyst can predict, and the gap between the two names I opened only widens.
None of this changes what I'd do with it. The Fed can hike or hold from here, but what split VICI from SL Green was never the yield they share, it was the cash flow underneath, and in my eyes that is a read you can learn today without waiting on the macro to sort itself out. Get that down and the sector stops looking like a wall of tempting yields and starts looking the way it does to me, a question of which buildings actually earn their keep.